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ABSTRACT 
 The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Cyber Red Teams are often a group of 
ethical hackers and offensive-trained security professionals who must continuously stay 
ahead of cybercriminals’ known tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Cyber Red 
Team certification and accreditation life cycle requires ongoing funding and time, while 
the United States’ near-peer state actors and non-state actors are continuously trying to 
breach its cybersecurity defenses. The information technology infrastructure must be 
continuously assessed for vulnerabilities; failing to do so will impact United States 
national security. These assessments require time and qualified security personnel, both 
of which are in short supply. The Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT) was 
previously developed at NPS to address personnel, time, and cost-related shortages in 
Cyber Red Teams. This research extends CARTT’s capabilities by implementing a 
web-based front-end graphical user interface (GUI) that enables non-expert users to 
identify vulnerabilities and launch exploits to help mitigate network vulnerabilities. This 
extended CARTT increases the DOD’s network systems’ cyber-readiness posture by 
providing necessary fixes, patches, and remediations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT) software was developed at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to address the problems identified in the Department of 
Defense (DOD) Inspector General’s March 2020 report [1]. The report outlines the 
constraints in maintaining and training the required Cyber Red Teams to continuously test 
DOD Information Technology (IT) infrastructures. The fast-growing cyber threats coupled 
with limited Red Team assets create a situation where the DOD needs to increase the 
number of trained advanced Cyber Red Teams [1]. 
Vulnerability assessments of DOD systems, networks, and facilities can take weeks 
or months, depending on the size of the network, complexity of the application architecture, 
and depth of the evaluation required. Cyber Red Teams are in acute shortage throughout 
the Department of the Navy (DON) due to the large amount of training and personnel 
required to maintain its networks. There are only a few available Red Teams regularly 
available to train system and network administrators.  
Cyber Red Teams are groups of ethical hackers and offensive trained security 
professionals who must stay ahead of cybercriminals’ known tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. A Red Team’s role is to imitate real-world attacks and mimic all possible cyber 
attackers’ techniques and methods while trying to break through multiple layers of an 
organization’s IT’s defensive perimeter. Therefore, every tool and technique available to 
cyber attackers must be analyzed and understood by Cyber Red Teams. 
The DOD Cyber Red Team shortage can be addressed through the implementation 
of software capabilities such as Red Team in a Box (RTIB) and Cyber Automated Red 
Team Tool (CARTT). Such software automates the use of baseline tools required to be 
performed by a Cyber Red Team on a browser-based GUI. These tools are geared toward 
non-expert Navy and USMC system administrators to assess their networks and mitigate 
vulnerabilities. 
Previous NPS research has been conducted in the development of CARTT as a 
proof-of-concept. This concept was intended to address the shortage of red team personnel 
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and training, and close the gap with the vulnerability assessment required in the DON 
systems, networks, and facilities not directly connected to the internet to maintain their 
confidentiality, integrity and available. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has 
sponsored research to extend the development of CARTT to enable it to access potential 
unknown vulnerabilities in a system by applying open-source software tools used by a 
Cyber Red Team to assess network securities vulnerabilities. 
CARTT is not intended to completely replicate Red Teaming capabilities. In fact, 
there is currently no tool available to fully automate red teaming actions. Joseph Plot’s 
thesis [2] developed a prototype called RTIB that automated a series of standard command 
line interface (CLI) commands allowing the user to interact with Network Mapper (Nmap), 
the Metasploit Framework (MSF), and Open Vulnerability Assessment System 
(OpenVAS) to conduct vulnerability assessments on target systems and networks. Preston 
Edward’s follow-on thesis [3] extended the capability of RTIB, rebranded as CARTT, by 
adding a GUI and capability to enable an operator to automate the process of vulnerability 
detection, analysis, and exploitation. Joseph Berrios’s thesis [4] further extended CARTT 
from a standalone host-based implementation to a client/server architecture allowing 
remote access to system operators and administrators. 
This current research has redesigned and improved the CARTT graphic user 
interface (GUI). This GUI is designed for use by for non-experts to assist them in 
identifying uncovered vulnerabilities in a vast number of IT infrastructures and generate a 
report. The development of a web-based GUI as a system administrator’s interface to do a 
full network vulnerabilities assessment provides the operator an easy to use and fully 
functional software tool that follows the Red Team operations and assessment procedures, 
but without requiring the user to possess these expert skills. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The web-based GUI was designed to be efficient and effective such that it does not 
require the user to be a Red Team expert in utilizing the site. Its development continues the 
integration of modern open-source penetration testing software tools and techniques as a 
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web-based interface application enabling its users to better assess an organization’s 
security postures. 
The following research question was investigated in this work: 
How can a web-based graphical user interface be developed for CARTT to allow 
non-expert users to build, integrate, and launch exploits using Cyber Red Teams tools and 
techniques? 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis has created a usable and straightforward web-based GUI for a non-
expert user with just what is required to do for the vulnerability assessments, host 
exploitations, and generate a report with all possible vulnerabilities and recommendations 
for remediation. The thesis scope includes creating a web-based GUI for CARTT that 
should allow a non-expert to be able to effectively use Cyber Red Teams open-source tools 
remotely in order to increase the cyber readiness throughout the DOD network. 
This thesis did not examine any specific environmental assessments, training 
effectiveness assessments, or accurate equipment assessments. This thesis also did not 
evaluate a particular vendor’s website or product. 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study has provided the DOD with the capability to assess the cybersecurity 
posture effectively and efficiently without solely relying on DOD Cyber Red Teams. DOD 
network administrators can use CARTT as a web-based dashboard application to conduct 
vulnerability assessments and generate meaningful network reports with mitigation 
recommendations. This prototype system will improve the overall DOD cybersecurity 
readiness by identifying vulnerabilities during combatant command (CCMD) operations, 
operational test and evaluation (OT&E) of systems, and agency-specified assessments [1]. 
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D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
1. Chapter II: Background  
This chapter includes an overview of prior work, the different tools and techniques 
used by Cyber Red Teams during their operations. It focusses on the differences on Red 
Teams and how each teams play their roles to maintain and evaluated their network defense 
in-depth. There is also a review on how CARTT is currently designed. 
2. Chapter III: Design Methodology 
This chapter describes the web-based CARTT design process requirements as a 
conceptual model. The chapter also evaluates and considers the user experience analysis 
that focuses on the characteristics that affect the design decisions and impact the 
performance. A task and execution analysis focuses on the environment, hierarchical 
structures, encoding schemes, and on a conceptual design with objectives to predict and 
improve users’ expectations in the GUI design. 
3. Chapter IV: Usability Testing and Evaluations 
This chapter describes the test plan, the design, and the implementation of the web-
based GUI. It discusses each test’s expected outcome versus the observed performance of 
the previous GUI and the problems encountered during the web-based GUI testing. The 
fundamental evaluation methods discuss the outcome in terms of vulnerability 
assessments, generated report overviews, and vulnerability remediation implementation. It 
also assesses how well the user experience fits the fidelity prototype. 
4. Chapter V: Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter describes the results of the prototype testing of web-based CARTT 
and discusses lessons learned and recommendations for future work to improve the tool. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In the endless cybersecurity battle between offensive and defensive operations, the 
attackers have virtually every advantage over the security analyst. Potential threats to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of an organization’s data, applications, 
critical systems, and other assets are growing more rapidly than in previous years. The 
attackers have virtually every advantage over the security analyst. Cyber-attackers often 
operate with no ethical, moral, or legal boundaries. Therefore, they can circumvent any 
physical and legal rules put in place by authorities. 
The DOD builds its IT network systems with a layered defense-in-depth approach 
to protect the CIA Triad of the network and its data [5] from unauthorized access while 
complying with frameworks from the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) [5] and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) [6]. With the daily 
increase of network attacks, the Defense Information Systems Agency’s cyber-defense 
tools blocked 300 million malicious actions against DOD computer systems in 2019 [7]. 
The sheer number of daily cyberattacks on the DOD networks shows the importance of 
providing the Combatant Commander with the personnel and cutting-edge tools necessary 
to expeditiously identify the various network security vulnerabilities [8], [9], [10]. Red 
Teaming and penetration testing are the primary cyber operations tools used to secure IT 
systems. 
A. CYBERSECURITY TEAMS OPERATIONS AND TOOLS 
1. Cyber Teams Roles, Responsibilities, and Expectations 
Cyber Teams are critical as they provide the opportunity to test an organization’s 
cybersecurity defenses in order to challenge and improve these defenses against rising 
threats. The need for Cyber Teams is critical. According to the Mimecast’s research, there 
was a 51% rise in ransomware from 2019 to 2020 [11]. This Mimecast research also 
showed that in 2020, 85% of companies surveyed reported email-based spoofing and 60% 
reported an increase in impersonation fraud [11]. 
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As shown in Figure 1, there are three types of cybersecurity teams: Blue Teams, 
Purple Teams, and Red Teams [12]. 
 
Figure 1. Comparing Red, Purple, and Blue Cybersecurity Teams. 
Source: [12] 
The Department of Defense defines the Red Teams as “independent, multi-
disciplinary groups … certified, accredited, and authorized to identify vulnerabilities that 
impact the confidentiality, integrity, or availability” of IT systems [1]. The DOD Cyber 
Red Team is defined as a group of people (military, civilian, and contractors) with the 
mission to penetrate the defense perimeter using possible adversary TTPs against a 
predefined target using any means authorized by the DOD [13]. 
The Red Team’s main objective is to assess the DOD’s ability to execute its mission 
in the cyber domain by emulating its adversaries using the latest penetration tools, 
methodologies, and standards and then provide a report for their findings. And since zero-
day vulnerabilities are unknown until they are discovered, our best “defense” is to conduct 
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a penetration testing of our systems continuously in order to identify and address every 
possible vulnerability beforehand and be in a position to mitigate discovered zero-day 
vulnerabilities. 
A cybersecurity Red Team plays the role of a stealthy threat actor, also known as 
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), but they are authorized to access a DOD organization’s 
network to mimic an APT’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). They attempt to 
penetrate the network’s defensive perimeter by any means necessary from the physical 
layer to the application layer [12]. Their main goal is to test the organization’s detection 
and response capabilities [12]. 
In addition to the Cyber Red Team, there are also penetration testers (pentesters) 
who use a similar strategy to identify, prevent, and mitigate security vulnerabilities. The 
pentesters use tools that cyber defenders can detect, also known as loud techniques. Their 
goal is to identify gaps within the cyber ecosystem, and they don’t try to hide their 
penetration activities [6]. In contrast, Cyber Red Teams are stealthy and avoid detection at 
all costs. 
A Cyber Blue Team is a group of IT security staff who are tasked to defend the 
network and systems from any cyber-attacks launched by the Red Team or any adversary 
trying to penetrate the defensive perimeter [12]. A Cyber Blue Team is continuously trying 
to improve the organization’s security posture. 
A Purple Team is a group of Red and Blue Team members who collaborate to 
maximize organizational security defensive efforts by discovering and repairing 
vulnerabilities to prevent data exploits [12]. 
2. Cybersecurity Red Team Penetration Testing Methods 
A cybersecurity Red Team examines digital and physical assets within the technical 
and operational processes. The Red Teaming assessment provides a distinct overview of 
organization’s IT system and network infrastructure from their perspective. Cyber Red 
Teams can assess the entire IT and network infrastructure or just a specific part of the 
network based on their assignment. Some of the Cyber Red Team testing methods are 
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somewhat reflective of industry standards which include physical and digital penetration 
testing, social engineering and phishing techniques, “threat modeling, vulnerability 
analysis, exploitation and post exploitation, and reporting” [6]. The Penetration Testing 
Execution Standard (PTES), which was created in 2009 by an ad hoc group of experts in 
the field of cybersecurity, provides guidelines for these techniques [6]. 
According to the PTES, physical penetration testing takes advantage of the 
loopholes within the physical layer [6]. For instance, adversary analyze shift rotation, 
employee habits (allowing piggybacking), surveillance cameras’ location and angles, and 
gate posture (which includes whether credentials are verified by gate guards or by computer 
systems). Digital penetration testing occurs when the Red Teams exploit the application 
layer through web-based applications to access a backend database [6]. Once the database’s 
vulnerabilities have been identified, the Red Team can launch SQL injection, cross-site 
scripting attacks, and impersonation attacks [6]. Information gathering is essential to any 
surgical attack process. 
From the PTES guidelines, social engineering by email and telephony are the most 
common and successful schemes used by Cyber Red Teams to gain entry to an 
organization’s cyber network system. Phishing techniques are used to manipulate 
employees to reveal information to compromise their network security. The Cyber Red 
Team can enumerate all exploitable vulnerabilities by making active connections and 
directed queries to target IT systems [6]. One of the primary objectives here is to discover 
and hijack users’ accounts, misconfigured shared resources (e.g., unsecured files and 
shares), and older software versions that are known to have security vulnerabilities issues 
(e.g., web servers with remote buffer overflows). The primary intent is to bypass the first 
defensive perimeter [6]. 
The PTES describes how threat modeling is executed once the first entry point has 
been discovered; passive or active scanning assessment can further monitor network traffic 
and assets to exploit the system and network infrastructure [6]. The Cyber Red Team takes 
advantage of the network service weaknesses by exploiting primarily unpatched assets and 
misconfigured network assets. Network-based assessments are conducted from central 
locations on the network, often using agentless monitoring [6]. The hacking and threat 
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modeling approach gives the Cyber Red Team the ability to assess computers’ vulnerability 
to attacks from within or outside the network and provides vulnerability information about 
network resources without being detected by monitoring agents, such as routers or firewalls 
[6]. 
During the vulnerability analysis, the Cyber Red Team uses agent-based 
monitoring tools on individual computers to conduct host-based assessments. In this 
approach, an agent is deployed on a host that requires a vulnerability risk assessment and 
it can provide a more accurate information while significantly reducing a false report 
(positive and negative) [6]. Another fundamental enumeration technique is banner 
grabbing, which involves connecting to a remote service and observing the response. 
Netcat and Telnet are manual tools used for grabbing banners and application information 
[6]. The above techniques can provide the Cyber Red Team the “make and model” of the 
online network services, which in many cases is enough to set vulnerability analysis in 
motion. 
During launching and exploitation, noticeable denial effects (for instance, 
degradation, disruption, or destruction) or system manipulation leads to a denial of service 
or data exploitation [14]. The attack’s main objective is to weaken the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the system or data by making the targeted systems and 
networks unavailable or untrustworthy. The Join Publication 3 12, Cyberspace Operations 
describes cyberspace exploitations as part of the offensive cyber operations (OCO) mission 
to gain intelligence, maintain systems and networks access, discover vulnerabilities, and 
perform other enabling actions required for current and future military operations collect 
information. Per national policies and international law, these actions are coordinated and 
deconflict with other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies [14]. 
During the exploitation, Cyber Red Teams want the system to execute the payloads while 
selecting the delivery method using the MSF or scripts created. To deliver the encoded 
payloads against a target, Cyber Red Teams use various built-in evasion and detection 
techniques. 
Reporting is key to any cybersecurity assessment. The reports should be tailored to 
the appropriate audience. The higher leadership must understand the report output in order 
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for them to make a proper financial decision, to see that there is a cost-benefit on mitigation 
and remediation requirements to solve the identified issues [6]. 
3. DOD Cyber Red Teams’ Operations and Rules of Engagement 
Red Teams are critical to the DOD network systems and structures evaluation. Only 
Red Teams certified by the National Security Agency (NSA) and accredited by U.S. 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) are authorized to operate on DOD’s live networks 
[13]. The DOD Cyber Red Teams are in a constant uphill battle against APTs, nation-state 
level threats, and state-sponsored groups. 
The Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide explicit instructions and define what can 
and cannot be done by operators. The Joint Publication 3-12 states that “DOD conducts 
CO consistent with U.S. domestic law, applicable international law, and relevant USG and 
DOD policies. The laws that restrict military actions in U.S. territory also apply to 
cyberspace” [14]. The Cyber Red Teams must ensure that established and agreed ROE are 
well known and authorized by the targeted network owner before any vulnerability 
assessments on a specific target are conducted. The Cyber Red Teams must comply with 
laws and policies and take into consideration “the global nature of cyberspace and the 
geographic orientation of domestic and international law” [14]. 
B. CYBER AUTOMATED RED TEAM TOOL 
In their master’s degree thesis research in 2019 and 2020, respectively, NPS 
computer science students Joseph Plot [2] and Preston Edwards [3] expanded on various 
types of available commercial and open-source tools for performing red teaming actions. 
In 2019, they developed CARTT, which provides the tools necessary to exploit 
undiscovered security vulnerabilities [2], [3] by automating OpenVAS and the MSF to 
scan, test, and discover vulnerabilities within a host. CARTT was developed to resolve the 
limitations associated with RTIB, developed to perform red team operations on target hosts 
[2], [3]. One major shortcoming of RTIB was that it had to be physically connected to the 
host. It was a standalone portable application run on a single device or laptop that needed 
to be directly connected to the target network. RTIB and CARTT were developed at the 
Naval Postgraduate School to address the shortage of Cyber Red Teams and augment their 
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operations by leveraging open-source software tools and frameworks. CARTT was the 
improved proof-of-concept tool that expended on RTIB. 
Currently, CARTT has a command and control (C2) capability with multiple users 
in different roles who can directly interact with the CARTT Server [4]. The implementation 
of CARTT uses a client/server-based C2 model that automates vulnerability scanning and 
host exploitation of target networks. Each CARTT user with their specified role can 
perform red teaming functions not just on the network that the operator resides on but also 
on any remotely accessible system defined by the operator [4]. 
1. Current CARTT Roles 
The current roles within CARTT are the operator, administrator, and commander. 
The operator’s role is to perform certain red teaming roles, such as vulnerability scanning 
and host exploitation [4]. All function outputs performed by the operator can be sent via a 
messaging system to the commander for assessment. Any message can be viewed by all 
assigned operators who fall under the same six-character alphanumeric code or Unit 
Identification Code (UIC) [4]. The commander located at the higher headquarters can task 
the operators to conduct network vulnerability assessments within the operator network 
and share information as required through the messaging system. The administrator’s role 
is to handle account access requirements ranging from user permissions to role assignment 
[4]. 
In CARTT, the operator receives guidance from the commander before further 
actions are taken [4]. If the operator executes any offensive engagement without 
authorization, it can constitute a federal crime [15]. The ROE should provide the operators 
with the peace of mind that they have the appropriate approval to run any vulnerability 
assessments without prosecution. The CARTT C2 messaging system should be used as a 
means of providing authorization to the operator, and all message logs should be retained 
based on a predetermined timeframe. 
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2. CARTT Tools 
CARTT uses open-source software tools to be cost-effective and straightforward to 
deploy, manage, and maintain. The main cyber operations tools used in CARTT are MSF 
and OpenVAS, running on Ubuntu 20.04. Other tools and programs are used to implement 
CARTT are the hypertext preprocessor (PHP) scripting language and My Structured Query 
Language (MySQL) [4]. 
MSF is intended to be used by an advanced security professional who has a solid 
understanding of penetration testing [2] implementation. MSF offers users an interactive 
console interface, a system command-line interface (CLI); a web interface is only available 
in the Professional version. MSF contains different modules that the user can interact with 
to employ exploits, payloads, auxiliary actions, and evasions [16], [17], [18]. Since early 
2018, a new evasion module type was added to Metasploit version 5.0 so that penetration 
testers can attempt to bypass known antivirus products and build their own evasion 
modules based on Metasploit’s research [17]. MSF uses a PostgreSQL database to store 
and access hosts, services, vulnerabilities, credentials, and user-agent strings captured by 
various scanning and exploit modules. MSF is packaged with real exploit modules that can 
result in real damage if not used properly [17]. 
Open Vulnerability-Assessment Scanner has many features that help Red Team 
operations, including simultaneous multiple host scanning, more than 50,000 network 
vulnerability tests, false-positive management, and scheduled scans [19]. Greenbone 
Networks has developed and maintained the scanner since 2009 [19]. 
Hypertext preprocessor is also an open-source server-side scripting language used 
for web development [20], based on Hypertext Markup Language (HML). It has one of the 
best built-in security protection layers. “PHP is used by 79% of all websites whose server-
side programming languages are known [20].” Since all essential programs of CARTT are 
running on the CARTT server, PHP is used as the core of CARTT [4]. It is a 
straightforward language that can interact with MySQL database [21]. MySQL database is 
used in the CARTT account and messaging system to fully manage the user credentials. 
MySQL is the world’s most popular open-source relational database management system 
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(RDBMS), distributed and supported by Oracle Corporation [22] and the most popular 
database for PHP applications [23]. PHP and MySQL are easy to learn, use, and deploy on 
nearly any machine due to their excellent open-source online documentation with a good 
framework of functions [21], [22]. 
3. CARTT Architecture Overview 
CARTT users can authenticate and access their role remotely through the server 
with the appropriate credentials via the internet. Through the CARTT client, the operator 
can execute network vulnerability assessments and detect vulnerabilities within a target 
network, including the network in which the operator resides [4]. Figure 2 shows the 
different types of users and the client server relationship. 
 
Figure 2. Sample CARTT Architecture. Source: [4]. 
4. CARTT Server overview 
The clients connect to the PHP server within the CARTT Server, which runs 
different CARTT scripts that perform the actions of CARTT. The CARTT Scripts engage 
with the MSF and OpenVAS tools to do vulnerability assessment and host exploitation on 
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a target network. Figure 3 shows that at the operational level, the clients and CARTT Server 
are required to be within the target network in order to perform assessments and 
exploitations [4]. 
With OpenVAS, a report can be generated in various types of formats. The report 
format is selected based on the audience and the export available. OpenVAS can create 
pivot tables to collect statistics data or combine multiple scan reports into one [19]. A 
CARTT script imports the OpenVAS report into MSF in extensible markup language 
(XML) format, and then the vulnerabilities found will be available in the MSF PostgreSQL 
database for follow-on CARTT operations [17]. 
 
Figure 3. CARTT Server Diagram. Source: [4]. 
5. Exploitation Process-Operator 
The CARTT operator’s process flow is complex because most of the exploitation 
of a target host is done under the operator role. The operator uses the below steps to assess 
a target network’s vulnerabilities while attempting to exploit the target host [4]. 
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1. Configure and conduct scan through CARTT on the target network by 
filling in a webform to utilize OpenVAS to conduct a vulnerability scan. 
2. Import the vulnerability scan into an MSF workspace. 
3. Select MSF workspace with its PostgreSQL database. This step gives the 
operator the ability to use different workspaces with information on the 
targets scanned. 
4. Select host, vulnerability, and MSF module for exploitation. 
5. The operator will receive feedback from CATT about the exploit status 
after all required selections are completed. 
6. Now the operator can pass the result of the scan to the commander via the 
CARTT messaging system for review and await further guidance. 
6. Exploitation Process Flow 
The operator connects to CARTT via the web browser with valid user credentials. 
The server validates the user’s role, redirects the user to the role assigned to them (operator 
in this case), and displays the operator’s main menu. For this exploitation process flow, the 
operator will get six options from the main menu. The server will point the selected options 
to OpenVAS. OpenVAS will then start the vulnerability scanning. The target will be 
getting the queries from OpenVAS, and then OpenVAS will display an analysis of the 
vulnerabilities. The user is provided with the possibility to view current or previous scans. 
The CARTT server will direct the user to an import option for the report. At this point, the 
operator can download the report where it can be put in a workspace. The operator can now 
enter the scan name to save it in a selected workspace. After the scan is completed, CARTT 
can now download the report from OpenVAS and redirect the operator to Metasploit. The 
list of hosts and vulnerabilities found in the generated workspace is now presented to the 
operator. Now the operator can select a host and a specific vulnerability. The operator will 
then get a list of the modules related to Metasploit’s vulnerability that have been found. 
CARTT will package the module selected with the target host and target vulnerability, 
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attempt to exploit the target, receive feedback, and display the information back to the user 
[4]. 
In the current design of CARTT, the operator is still required to know the basic 
functions of red teaming. Training is required to teach them the basic CARTT functionality 
and how to navigate through the necessary functions on the main menu after the operator 
has authenticated through the server. The operator and commander are not required to 
know how the underlying CARTT tools, such as OpenVAS and MSF, interact. The 
administrator, however, needs to know how to assign the appropriate roles and permissions 
and have a basic understanding of the tools running under CARTT. The commander is 
required to understand the C2 messaging system functionality after login since this will 
allow the commander to receive updates and assign tasks to the operator [4]. 
7. User Operations Overview 
The user accesses CARTT by logging into CARTT via a client/browser interface 
that tracks the user’s assigned role before any scan of the targeted network is possible. 
After login in, the user is required to have at a minimum the following information to 
conduct a scan: target IP range and create a name for the scan before performing a network 
vulnerability assessment. Once the results are provided to the user via the CARTT client 
from the scan, the user can select the host(s), the vulnerabilities, and payload. The user can 
now run the selected desired vulnerability and exploited modules on the host(s) from the 
client’s information. The user has to balance the possible operation impact with the client 
scan information and the user’s desired effect before making the appropriate selections. 
The user will receive a result from the client after the exploit is run. CARTT allows the 
user to run multiple vulnerabilities testing by selecting different options for the host, 
vulnerability, and module [4]. 
8. User Experience Design Considerations 
Usability is a critical part of the UX because it is how users will access the 
functionality within the application to meet their satisfaction [24]. The basic concept of 
UX design is to observe the user trying the interface and record where they run into 
problems so that the designer can go back and make the necessary correction to improve 
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the UX [24], [25]. The usability goal is to increase the effectiveness, efficiency, 
memorability, and satisfaction while decreasing the number of errors [25]. Because of 
CARTT’s intended audience, effectiveness and error anticipation should be the top 
priorities in the interface design because the user is untrained in red teaming. 
a. Effectiveness 
In 2001, Whitney Quesenbery, the UX and usability expert defines effectiveness as 
whether the users can accomplish their task with a high degree of accuracy [24]. Therefore, 
the application’s effectiveness can be measured by how easily a user can learn the system 
the first time without making mistakes. The quicker the user learns to navigate through the 
application, the more meaningful the tasks are. A few factors can improve effectiveness 
[24]. First, the designer should be familiar with the existing internet metaphors and use 
them in the design, it helps quickly familiarize the user with the website. Second, the 
consistency helps with the familiarity of the application, which in turn helps with the 
usability. The designer should make the application predictable and straightforward for the 
users. For instance, a search and help button should have a different function because they 
mean something different. 
b. Memorability 
Designers should create the application so that it is easy to recognize by making the 
task incredibly clear to become more comfortable the second time for the users. As human, 
we tend to forget the tasks or steps that are too complex [26]. A couple of examples to 
increase the user memorability are providing the user with something that they can visually 
relate to because we easily relate to visual icons. Consistency also plays a role in improving 
memorability. 
c. Satisfaction 
Users should not be leading the GUI application, but the other way around, so that 
the users get the result the designer expected, which provides user satisfaction. While 
navigating through the application, the user experience should be pleasurable, the designer 
should create an attractive design, with colors, fonts, sound, and visual cues. The designer 
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should create an application that allows the users to search and select the first rational 
option, a strategy known as satisficing, a combination of the word “satisfy” and “suffice” 
[27]. According to Simon, humans are not always looking for the best possible solutions 
to their problems. They operate in “bounded rationality” where time, environment, 
language, limitation in their acquisition of knowledge, awareness reasoning, and control 
over the outcome play a significant role in their decision making [24]. 
d. Errors 
Basic errors, like selecting the wrong control will occur because the CARTT 
audience are expected to be non-expert in Red Teaming. Designers should expect users to 
make mistakes. Therefore, focusing on handling the errors and helping the users to 
minimize errors and by solving the issue on their own is critical [24]. Any programming 
design is susceptible to error because of the ecosystems in which the program resides [28]. 
Error tolerance should be built in the design, which creates an environment where the users 
can correct their errors with the “redo” option. This option gives the users a sense of control 
and build their confidence, trust, and empathy. 
C. USER INTERFACE ACCESS CONTROLS AND SECURITY 
The end-user has always been the weakest link in the security of any system. The 
software developer and web developer must find a balance between usability and security. 
Web access control restricts access to application resources. A few basic security principles 
must be incorporated during the design process to preserve the data’s confidentiality, 
accessibility, and availability. User interface security is far more than just having an 
effective policy for passwords and encryption. It is critical to design security into the 
interface and it must be made visible and apparent to the user to meet security expectations 
and the minimum industry standards. Below are the most common secure/usability issues. 
1. Authentication and Authorization 
For a web application, authentication and authorization are essential for security 
control to ensure access to authorized users only. Authentication ensures that the users’ 
credentials and identities are validated as a prerequisite before authorizing them to access 
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information systems [29]. Username and password are a simple but highly effective form 
of single-factor authentication for CARTT. Short length of password is easy to hack and 
lengthy password are difficult to memorized. The login page will have to follow the current 
industry standards set by the DOD [30]. In the next chapter we will present the entire UI. 
Figure 4 shows the login page for the CARTT user.  
 
Figure 4. CARTT Previous Login Page. Source: [4]. 
Access controls, also known as authorization, are required to reassure the users that 
their data is safe [29]. Authorization is essential to secure the access and control of the 
users’ traffic and assure the user the data confidentiality in each application system [31]. 
According to the 2019 statistics report from Positive Technologies, every one out of three 
application had broken authentication, which led to unauthorized disclosure, modification, 
or data destruction [32]. In CARTT, the operator should not be granted the role of 
Commander or Administrator and allowed access to those roles’ permissions. 
In Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), the organization creates and enforces 
access authorization based on roles and responsibilities of each user, the organizational 
structure and the organization’s security policy requirements [33]. It is the best access 
control method to implement in CARTT to restrict network access. This method ensures 
that only the information users required to access is presented to them. 
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Only authorized personnel should be granted access to CARTT applications 
without authorization. Placing users in their appropriate roles also determines what 
resources they are authorized to access. Authentication and authorization provide a security 
layer to applications and ensure that only verified and validated users explicitly access 
certain information and resources. There is currently no forgotten password option, as 
shown in Figure 4. This option should be given to the user to reset the password without 
going through the administrator. This option will provide the user the opportunity to reset 
their password or username by providing the email address that was used to register the 
account. 
2. Security 
Securing a web application from possible threats will prevent things like leaking 
confidential information and breaking the application system database [34]. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends that web applications move to 
multifactor authentication [5]. A report released by Positive Technologies indicates that 
the most common web application vulnerability is security misconfiguration [32]. The 
report details that security misconfigurations were found in 84 percent of web applications. 
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is used to execute a script to capture the user’s session 
identifier (Session Hijacking), pushing malicious software, bypassing restrictions, 
impersonate the application’s user to steal authentication cookies, and a Denial of Service 
(DOS) attack in order to make IT systems and devices inaccessible [31]. According to 
NIST, the safest way to prevent XSS is to validate and filter all data properly before they 
are sent to the database. 
Broken authentication and authorization were found in 45 percent of web 
applications [32]. The sessions control authentication and authorization. With XSS, 
hackers can steal the users’ credentials or try to access the application. An attacker can 
exploit XSS to brute force the credentials, accesses the web application, and escalates the 
application access privilege. Using CARTT login should prevent session attacks or 
manipulations. A session timeout or a logout after a period should be implemented. The 
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) should contain no stored information to prevent 
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searching into the cache information and session identity numbers should not be stored 
where the cache is required within the web browser [31]. 
SQL injection were found in 29 percent of web applications [32]. It is an injection 
by an attacker of potential harmful SQL queries and executing a command to the server to 
access the backend database in order to manipulate the data by deleting, inserting, and 
updating the data. To prevent SQL injection and the risk of manipulating SQL statements, 
the web application developer must ensure that all the client side’s input is filtered before 
entering the database. The validation of users’ input will prevent SQL injection on the 
database [31]. 
3. Testing 
Testing is vital for any web design. User interface (UI) testing and functionality 
testing are especially vital for a web application [35]. UI testing is a problem-solving 
approach that improves navigation, layout, browser compatibility, and content. User 
interface testing focuses on the overall appearance and navigation flow from the user 
perspective across multiple experimental studies. It is also an opportunity to learn more 
about the application’s users and improve the application system. Functionality testing 
helps to test the logic and flow behind the application. It is also part of the quality 
assurance. The list of testing required to ensure that the web application is working 
correctly to the required specifics will be discussed in detail in the Testing Chapter. 
CARTT will have to be thoroughly tested to ensure it only does what it claims to do, and 
nothing more, before it is used on any DOD system or network. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter covered the importance of DOD Cyber Red Teams. It discussed 
notable red team tools, roles and responsibilities, rules of engagement, and products, 
including an overview of current NPS work in developing CARTT. It also analyzed how 
the UI design and the security implementation process can help create a usable and 
functional CARTT application capable of closing the gap with the vulnerability assessment 
requirements of DOD systems, networks, and facilities. In the next chapter, we discuss the 
CARTT GUI prototype implementation. 
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III. DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
This chapter focuses on the web design methodology used to develop CARTT’s UI. 
The objective was to provide a pleasant aesthetic user experience, communicate the intended 
functions, and facilitate ease of access to the content presented. Below is the design 
methodology used to develop the CARTT web-based GUI design by analyzing the needs and 
wants of each end user. 
A. VISUAL DESIGN 
Visual design is used to make the data and the user interaction with the content of the 
application clear and presentable. Visual design helps to draw the user’s eye and focus on the 
correct message and functionality. Nielsen’s ten usability heuristics guidelines elements of 
quality attributes of design have been used to increase customer experience and clearly 
communicate the messages behind the object. 
B. PROTOTYPE 
The exploration of the problem space has been determined in Chapter 2 and the work 
done by previous students to initiate envision of the system. The Design methodology 
explored the solutions available and analyze the UI for the system design and the user’s needs.  
C. CARTT UI OVERVIEW 
CARTT provides a client/browser interface that allows local network defenders to 
perform Red Team vulnerability assessment on their own networks. The UI is automated to 
interact with MSF, OpenVAS, and other penetration testing tools. CARTT is designed to run 
on a single server that runs the authentication credentials and processes the applications 
needed to perform basic red team assessment. As stated previously, CARTT users can log in 
with three profiles: operator, commander, or administrator. 
D. NEEDS ANALYSIS/MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
The CARTT needs analysis outlines the requirements of the web design, as stated in 
Chapter II. In summary, the main objective is to provide the local DOD network defenders 
24 
with an automated tool to conduct a red team assessment within their network. CARTT 
performs the basic red team functions to help increase the cybersecurity readiness of the 
DOD’s networks without the need for the user to go through expensive and time-consuming 
training required by red teams. 
A CARTT operator can scan a target host or network for vulnerabilities. At the 
conclusion of the scan, the operator can view the list of target vulnerabilities from the 
OpenVAS vulnerability scan via MSF, and then view a list of applicable MSF exploit modules 
by selecting a host and vulnerability. The user should feel that they are in control and that the 
process flow is spontaneous. The feedback received from the selected exploit module by MSF 
provides the relevant information to the operator. It is crucial that this feedback be in plain 
language that is easy for non-expert red team users to understand. 
If the user is not satisfied with the tool’s results, he or she might stop using the 
application. Therefore, the user should have visibility of the network topology with the 
number of internet protocols used within a subnet. The exploitation possibilities associated 
with the modules should be critical to the user because it provides them with relevant data on 
the vulnerabilities present within the network. The success of the mapping of the network, 
view of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), exploitation, and messaging 
systems are used as acceptance criteria in the previous CARTT web design [4]. 
E. USER ANALYSIS 
The user analysis focuses on enumerating the attributes of CARTT users to identify 
their respective needs that must be addressed by the UI. The user analysis identifies what 
impact design decisions have on performance so that we have a baseline for measuring 
performance against actual user types. 
CARTT is designed for three primary user roles: 
Commander: The network operation manager has the role of assigning tasks to the 
subordinate unit. The Commander is not required to perform any red team assessments. The 
Commander is a user who is at higher headquarters (e.g., Tier I DISA, Tier II 
MCCOG(CSSP), and Tier III MITSC/RNOSC), and is responsible for the operations and the 
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maintenance functions of an enterprise system, equipment, or infrastructure throughout their 
respective area of responsibility. The Commander maintains authority for Active Directory 
(AD) Organizational Unit (OU) structure and permission delegation, and to administer objects 
and their containers at the enterprise level. The AD OU comprises critical elements that 
provide effective management and security of systems. The Commander has the authority to 
authorize or delegate a vulnerability assessment at the lowest level to a Network Operator. 
Network Operator: In CARTT, the operator is expected to perform the basic red team 
tasks, ranging from network configuring to conducting a vulnerability scan of the network 
through a web-UI. The permissions are delegated by the appropriate regional network 
operation manager at a tier level to support the mission requirements. The network operator 
operates and maintains the servers performing enterprise level service. The UI was designed 
to support the network operator as the primary user of CARTT. 
Network Operation Administrator: The administrator role in CARTT is to manage 
and maintain user accounts and access privileges to the network and its programs, processes, 
and applications. They are accountable and responsible for functions related to the specific 
enterprise directory, messaging, file sharing, domain controller, Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP), and Domain Name System (DNS) functions. Network administrators 
receive the training to install, operate, secure, and maintain DOD computer networks and 
database. The network operation administrator’s skills require the administrator to be familiar 
with routing protocols, Virtual Private Networks (VPN), Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC), 
subletting, traffic monitoring and cybersecurity. We expect network operation administrator 
users to have the basic knowledge outlined in the DOD Directive 8140, which establishes the 
required training, certification, and management of all DOD employees who conduct 
cybersecurity functions. 
F. PREVIOUS CARTT UI WALKTHROUGH 
The following is a description of the CARTT UI as it appeared prior to the work 
done by Joseph Berrios in his thesis [4]. Each of the user roles executes different tasks and 
their access privileges are based on their login. Figure 5 represents the operator main page 
with six action options: 
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Figure 5. Previous CARTT Operator Main Page 
The “Configuration and Conduct a Scan” selection provides the operator the 
opportunity to conduct a scan within a specific IP address range, and to provide a name for 
the scan as shown in Figure 6. After the required fields are completed with the appropriate 
inputs, the operator can click “Submit” to conduct a scan. 
 
Figure 6. Previous CARTT Operator Scan Page 
Upon submission of the input inquiry, CARTT validates the IP address within the 
provided subnet. The submission starts MSF and loads OpenVAS into MSF. CARTT sends 
OpenVAS the query parameters and starts the network scan. A visual status is generated to 
provide the user with a percentage of completion. When the requested scan completes, 
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CARTT will redirect the operator to the main welcome page, where they can import the 
scan results using “Import a Completed Scan” (see Figure 5). This program sends the scan 
to MSF to begin target exploitation. Closing the browser UI does not stop the scanning 
process, which provides the user the flexibility to attend to other tasks. 
Figure 7 shows the status of previously started and completed scans. The operator 
has the option to view the status of previous scans. 
 
Figure 7. Previous CARTT Scan Status Page 
Figure 8 shows the option for the user to import a scan into a workspace by 
providing the operator with a list of previously completed OpenVAS vulnerability reports. 
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Figure 8. Previous CARTT Scan Import Page 
After submission of the import request, CARTT sends a request to MSF for 
OpenVAS to download the vulnerability report submitted as an XML file. In turn, MSF 
ingests that XML file into a workspace named by the operator. 
Upon completion of the scan import, the operator will be redirected to the CARTT 
Exploitation System page as shown in Figure 9, where the provided name for the MSF 
workspace will auto-populate in the desired workspace field. 
 
Figure 9. Previous CARTT Exploitation System 
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After submission, CARTT displays the list of all the hosts detected and all 
vulnerabilities from Metasploit within the named workspace of the scan requested. The 
operator now has the option to pick a specific host from the displayed list for vulnerability 
exploitation and evaluation. As shown in Figure 10, the operator enters the selected host 
IP address in the Target Host IP Address field then clicks the “Submit Query” button. 
 
Figure 10. Previous Target Host IP Address Query 
After submission of the query, the operator is presented with all the vulnerabilities 
associated with the target host. The operator now can choose the desired Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number from the list presented for exploitation, and 
then copy it in the provided field as shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Query 
After submission of the query, MSF opens and searches for any available exploit 
module for the submitted CVE. As shown in Figure 12 the operator must copy and paste 
the desired MSF exploit module to construct an exploit. 
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Figure 12. Modules Query 
After submission of the query, CARTT creates a script to execute the exploit. 
CARTT configures the exploit, set the target host, and attempt to launch the exploit. As 
shown in Figure 13, the operator receives feedback from MSF upon completion of the 
submitted query. The feedback provides the operator with the existence of a capability to 
gain a foothold in the target host. As the user is not fully trained on red teaming, the 
expectation for the operator is to have a clear indication of the result that the exploit worked 
as shown in Figure 13, which indicates that an MSF exploit session was opened. 
 
Figure 13. CARTT Exploitation Test Page 
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Figure 14 shows the main page for the administrator with their roles to manage 
CARTT user accounts and organizations. The executable tasks are displayed in the labeled 
radio buttons with text fields showing the options available for the administrator. 
 
Figure 14. Previous CARTT Administrator Menu 
In the original CARTT implementation, there is no visualization used to make the 
data and the content of the application or site clear and presentable to its users. Cascading 
style sheets (CSS) were not implemented in the structure, nor in graphical user interface 
design. Therefore, the content was not made to be easily understandable by UI designer. 
There were no colors used in the original CARTT, as the only colors were black and white, 
whereas human minds react more positively to colors. There was a lack of structured pages 
and content boxes with a symmetric design suitable for traditional users. Also, there was 
no password security reinforcement during the user account setup. On the previous design, 
password security did not comply with NIST Special Publication 800–63B rev. 3 [36]. The 
main objective of the original CARTT was the functionality rather than the UI, and this 
new design tried to put the user’s needs and requirements while maintaining and improving 
functionality. 
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G. USER INTERFACE DESIGN GUIDELINES 
In user interface design, we are concerned about how the interface behaves under 
specific user scenarios, not how the software is designed or constructed. Design guidelines 
must be followed to make sure that the user is not frustrated and to improve the UX 
satisfaction.  
To address the UX we should consider and apply Jakob Nielsen and Rolf Molich’s 
ten general principles for interaction design heuristics guidelines [3], [37], [38], [39], [40]. 
These guidelines were used to design CARTT’s graphical user interface:   
1. “Visibility of system status”: Nielsen recommends that users should 
always be aware of what is going on and have visibility of the system’s 
status through appropriate feedback and within a reasonable time [37], 
[39]. The UI should be clear and presentable to the user by making the 
content of the data readable and easy to understand. The visualization tells 
the story by guiding the user to a series of tasks and indicating what 
possible options are available to them. Data visualizations help 
communicate the relationships between different statistical data, 
relationships in a data set, users, and designers [37], [38]. In CARTT, the 
focus was on computer programs for desktop devices, and no input was 
collected on website efficiency and usability from the users’ perspective. 
2. Matching the system to the real world: According to Nielsen, designers 
“should speak the users’ language. Use words, phrases, and concepts 
familiar to the user, rather than internal jargon. Follow real-world 
conventions, making information appear in a natural and logical order” 
[39]. The design should use useful recognizable metaphors and language 
used in the DOD wherever possible. The information should be presented 
to the user in a logical manner. The end-state is to reduce the cognitive 
burden and make the systems more comfortable to use [3]. 
3. Providing “control and freedom” to the user: Nielsen advises designers to 
give users “a clearly marked ‘emergency exit’ to leave the unwanted 
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action without having to go through an extended process” [39]. The users 
should feel they are in control by giving them the initiative so that they 
have the option to undo and redo previous tasks [37].  
4. Ensuring “consistency and standards”: Nielsen suggests that the “users 
should not have to wonder whether different words, situations, or actions 
mean the same thing. Follow platform and industry conventions” [39]. 
Inconsistency brings friction and makes tasks complex. The reverse is that 
consistency brings clarity. The designer should always use the same 
patterns in language, imagery, color scheme, borders, font, size, and 
symbols in the same way to facilitate efficiency [30], [37]. Consistency 
helps with user memorability [41]. 
5. Preventing errors: Nielsen warns that “Good error messages are important, 
but the best designs carefully prevent problems from occurring in the first 
place. Either eliminate error-prone conditions, or check for them and 
present users with a confirmation option before they commit to the action” 
[39]. Error minimization while designing the application is essential to 
minimize the user’s frustrations. When errors occur, the user should be 
able to identify them quickly, and the adverse impact must be small [37]. 
Saving user information for a short period and an autofill option are useful 
to minimize user errors [41], [37]. For the user, run-time errors are the 
most significant, compile-time errors are less significant. The UI designer 
should plan on testing and anticipate the possible types of errors that a 
user might encounter [37]. 
6. Focusing on “recognition rather than recall”: Nielson advocates that the 
designer “minimize the user’s memory load by making elements, actions, 
and options visible. The user should not have to remember information 
from one part of the interface to another. Information required to use the 
design (e.g., field labels or menu items) should be visible or easily 
retrievable when needed” [39]. The designers should not force the user to 
remember commands and actions; they should help them choose. The 
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application should help minimize the cognitive load, effort exerted, or 
required during their reasoning and thinking [37]. Our attention span has 
gradually declined over the years, from 20 seconds to 8 seconds in 2020 
[42]. The psychologist George Miller, put forward the idea that people can 
store “between five and nine items in short-term memory” [26] and which 
he called “the magic number 7.” Our memory, in general, can hold plus or 
minus seven numbers. Therefore, using familiar terms from other sites and 
keeping digits memorization to a minimum will help the user recognize 
the tasks, minimize the learning process, and memorize the number, which 
will ultimately help the user to learn the web CARTT process faster [41]. 
7. Applying “flexibility and efficiency of use”: Nielson recommends the use 
of “Shortcuts — hidden from novice users — may speed up the interaction 
for the expert user such that the design can cater to both inexperienced and 
experienced users. Allow users to tailor frequent actions” [39]. The 
designer should balance learnability with efficiency. The system should be 
usable by learners with the intent to make them efficient experts [37]. 
Efficiency measures how quickly a task is completed after the learning 
phase [43]. 
8. Applying “aesthetics and minimalist design”: Nielson mentions that the 
“interfaces should not contain information which is irrelevant or rarely 
needed. Every extra unit of information in an interface competes with the 
relevant units of information and diminishes their relative visibility” [39]. 
The designer should keep clutter to a minimum. The human attention span 
and the short memory must be considered because all information 
competes for the user’s attention [26]. You should only present what is 
needed or required to do the task, minimizing complexity by keeping the 
cognitive load low. The designer should remove all unnecessary functions 
and information by using progressive disclosure and breaking down 
complex tasks into comprehensible steps. They should prioritize the views 
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of the task to only what is required. These processes help the users to 
focus on the relevant information [37]. 
9. Helping users recognize, diagnose, and recover from errors: Nielson 
advocate to the designer that “error messages should be expressed in plain 
language (no error codes), precisely indicate the problem, and 
constructively suggest a solution” [39]. Web CARTT should be designed 
to use simple language to bring a user back to a known state, something 
that is familiar so that the user can recovered from slips or mistakes. Web 
CARTT should provide a messaging feedback system that suggests a 
solution to help the users identify, diagnose, and recover from errors 
independently [37]. 
10. Helping and documentation: Nielson supports the idea that “it’s best if the 
system doesn’t need any additional explanation. However, it may be 
necessary to provide documentation to help users understand how to 
complete their tasks” [39]. Help menus and documentation provide an 
architectural overview of the web application [41]. Each help menu should 
be tailored to the specific task, and they should be easily understood by a 
non-technical user. They should provide the content categories and 
features of the applications and websites. The designer should create 
“Help menus” with the intent that the user would only read this as a last 
result in order to interact with the system and the process must be usable 
to all types of users [37]. 
Once we identified who the users are in each assigned role as described in Section 
B.1, we can apply these guidelines to increase the user experience (UX). The Interaction 
Design Foundation defines the UI design as the “process where the designers use to build 
interfaces in software” applications and interact with the users guidelines above [37]. 
Currently, CARTT was not designed primarily with the UX in mind, focusing on looks or 
style. The main focus was on software functionality. 
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H. CARTT’S NEW DESIGN 
As previously stated, CARTT has been designed with three user categories in mind: 
operator, commander, and administrator. Each category is given the option to login, and 
their login credential is associated with their role on the CARTT server. This new login 
process provides simplicity for the user, with options to sign up for a new account, log out, 
and request to unlock an account. The new design used human-readable string values using 
a hash table versus forcing the users to remember numbers that correspond to specific roles 
as shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Corresponding Role Numbers 
Figure 16 shows how the user roles are mapped to their corresponding values 
defined in the database. 
37 
 
Figure 16. Human Readable Mapping 
Figure 17 shows the security implementation code to reinforce p criteria during the 
account setup. 
 
Figure 17. Password Input Control 
1. Login Page 
The new login screen, shown in Figure 18, is easy to understand and does not 
require the user to think too much. The login page itself is quite simple, with the form 
taking the center of the screen. Users can login with an approved email address and 
password created during previous registration. The page offers a bit of usability-friendly 
guidance to help reduce the possibility of invalid input. Another type of validation will 
appear during a failed login attempt and specifies what went wrong. All validations are 
connected to warning colors and other visual cues. 
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Figure 18. New CARTT Login Page 
The registration page uses the same framework as the login page so that the user 
maintains familiarity with the page shown in Figure 18. This helped to increase 
memorability and simplified the creation of a PHP webpage. The registration email 
requires a unique email address that is also used as a unique digital identifier since the 
DOD email is unique to each employee. The password required during the account creation 
must be a minimum of 8 characters, and must contain at least one number, one uppercase 
letter, and one lowercase letter. The pop-up dialog box shown in Figure 19 provides 
feedback to the user to make sure their input conforms to the password requirements set 
for each entry field. The Unit Identification Code (UIC) provides a layer of security during 
the account request sign up because each user is assigned to a command’s UIC. During the 
sign-up process, the user has the option to use the dropdown list which allows role selection 
via a collapsible list (Operator, Administrator, and Commander). This is an efficient form 
intended to reduce user error during the input entry. 
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Figure 19. New CARTT Registration Page 
2. Commander Page 
The commander page shown in Figure 20 is designed to reflect the role of a CARTT 
user at the higher headquarters. The expectation is for a commander to send messages with 
instructions to the operator or the administrator to perform specific tasks. The commander 
is not expected to conduct red team assessments as their primary function. 
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Figure 20. New CARTT Commander Page 
3. Message Page 
The “Message” page is used by all CARTT roles to send text messages between 
CARTT users. The messages submitted in CARTT are viewable by all users. The UIC 
provided determines which unit the message is directed to. CARTT users can only send 
emails to a UIC that is registered in CARTT; the user would get an error if they entered an 
unregistered UIC. The maximum characters allowed within the message body is set to 255, 
as shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. New CARTT Message Page 
4. Administrator Page  
Figure 22 shows the main page for the administrator with direct access to the menus 
required to do their assigned tasks. Clear label buttons are provided with text fields to make 
sure the user understands what action each button provides. As an example, the “Unlock 
Account” button allows the administrator to unlock accounts that have been locked due to 
multiple login failures. The buttons serve as a middleman between the user and the action 
required. They also serve as a translation action between the user and CARTT. 
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Figure 22. New CARTT Administrator Page 
Throughout the new design, warnings have been explicitly provided for irreversible 
actions so that the user understands their implications. Figure 23 shows an example of this, 
with warnings displayed so that the administrator has a clear understanding that when an 
account is deleted, it can no longer be recovered. 
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Figure 23. New CARTT Administrator Delete Account Page 
5. Operator Main Menu 
The CARTT operator is the is the most demanding because most of the red teaming 
activities are done by this role. The operator menu as shown in Figure 24 has a similar look 
and feel to the administration menu (see Figure 22) for simplicity and efficiency of design. 
The action buttons are designed to ensure the operator can easily select the desired task and 
are displayed in the typical sequence the operator should use to conduct red teaming tasks 
assigned by the commander. The sidebar navigation menu was designed to the left side of 
the page (shown in Figure 23) for ease of user action access and readability. The left menu 
bar will remain available even after the operator selects a task. The name of each icon is 
used to visually communicate what each button does. Figure 25 shows the implementation 
code of the left side navigation panel <div> (division/section). Here the block-level 
container for the HTML file is used to add structure/group components containing 
shortcuts on the main menu. This Skeuomorphism is used because users are familiar with 
this concept, and it mimics real-world email applications. 
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Figure 24. New CARTT Operator Main Menu Page 
 
Figure 25. Left Side Navigation Panel <Div> 
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A logout option has been added in all pages. This gives the security and the 
flexibility to the use to completely end a session and return to the login page. Figure 26 
shows the code implementation for the logout and redirection. 
 
Figure 26. CARTT Logout and Redirect to Login Page 
The following sub-sections describe each of the operator action buttons in the main menu. 
6. Create New Scan 
This action button allows the operator to create and run a vulnerability scan on a 
target. The operator is required to enter the inputs for a specific target IP address and subnet 
and provide a scan name as shown in Figure 27. This input format is required because it is 
the minimum information needed by OpenVAS to perform a scan. This simple UI design 
is a carryover of the guidelines described in the login page to increase user memorability, 
learnability, satisfaction, and minimize errors [40]. In order to reduce the possibility of 
input error, invalid-character checks have been integrated, and the user will receive a pop-
up error message to correct an erroneous input. The left menu is used here as well because 
eye-tracking studies have found that most users look from the top to the left area of a 
computer monitor, mimicking the most natural reading pattern (left to right and top to 
bottom) [39]. Once again, the left menu provides the operator with quick access to all the 
tools available to them. 
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Figure 27. New CARTT Operator Scan Network Menu Page 
7. Check Scan Status 
This action button allows the operator to check the status of a previously scanned 
network. If the CARTT Scan Status menu shows the user that a scan has completed, this 
indicates to the operator that the scan is ready for import. The operator can then select the 
“Import Completed” button on the left to begin importing previously completed scan. 
Whenever a scan is not completed, the user is notified of the scan status as “In progress.” 
The operator can import the scan within the same page without selecting a different web 
page as shown in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28. New CARTT Check Previous Scan Page 
8. Import Completed Scan 
This action button allows the operator to import existing completed OpenVAS 
scans into an MSF workspace. The design maintains the same name for the workspace as 
that of the scan name for simplicity and ease of use for the operator, as shown in Figure 
29. This option arms the operator with the ability to restart previously configured scans 
without reentering any previous input parameters by selecting the button to import. 
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Figure 29. New CARTT Import Completed Page 
9. Begin Target Exploitation 
This action button provides the operator the capability to interact with the MSF 
workspace so that they can configure and test the available modules as exploit. The 
operator is given the list of hosts available within the IP space that was previously enter. 
After selecting the host’s IP address for vulnerability analysis, CARTT will display the 
number of vulnerabilities associated with that host. Currently, CARTT only shows the 
common vulnerabilities and exposure (CVE). 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the research design/methodology used to develop and 
improve the web-based CARTT application. The simplistic design focused on the three 
CARTT user categories, and primarily the operator. The design used the heuristic 
evaluation and usability methods to improve the UI and UX.  
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IV. USABILITY TESTING AND EVALUATIONS 
The User Interface test and evaluation were based on the quality measures 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The heuristic evaluation focused on usability criteria to 
evaluate the interface design, possible interactive framework errors, button labels, etc. The 
designer completed testing during the design and development phases but expanding the 
testing and evaluation to actual users of the tool gave us the chance to improve the design 
and logic to fit the users’ needs. 
This chapter will begin with a presentation and discussion of the scenario design 
that was used to develop the task list that users were asked to complete. The task list was 
then used to develop the usability specification that, for each task, identified what usability 
attribute was being tested and what measurement(s) were used to assess if the specification 
has been met. The scenario testing describes the methodology and details of exactly what 
participants were instructed to do during the user test. Finally, the user testing data is 
presented. 
A. SCENARIO TESTING 
The operator user scenario was created to analyze the operator error rate while 
trying to accomplish each task in the new CARTT GUI. This test captured the users’ 
satisfaction as they executed each task.  
The task analysis provided an in-depth understanding of the importance, frequency, 
and sequence of actions that a user must execute to complete specific critical tasks within 
CARTT. Most of the operations and objectives in CARTT are designed around the operator 
primarily, and the administrator secondarily. Prior to test and evaluate the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and user satisfaction for these two roles, five volunteers were used for this 
study. Three are Computer Science, one Cyber Systems Operations, and one National 
Security Affairs, all students at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). All were in or beyond 
their fourth quarter of education at NPS.  
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1. User Briefing  
The briefing language below was used to make sure there was consistency in the 
testing process. The users needed to understand that we were evaluating the application 
interface and the focus was not on their ability.  
Thank you for agreeing to help us test our interface for a new CARTT 
application for the following tasks: account creation, configuration, 
checking previous scan, started importing new scans and viewing and 
sending messages. We are going to give you a set of tasks we would like 
you to execute on the prototype to determine the effectiveness of the 
interface. This is an evaluation of the interface, not of you, so if you have 
difficulties with any of the tasks, it is because our interface is lacking and is 
in no way a reflection on you. 
For each task, a scenario was read to the test user to provide context, and then they 
were given the opportunity to execute the scenario tasks. We also provided them the 
opportunity to ask questions and request clarification before the execution of each task.  
B. SCENARIO DESIGN 
The test questions were generated based on the application requirements and design 
to evaluate the UI for all the features to support the functionality, usability, interface, 
performance, and security features. All five test subjects were graduate students at the 
Naval Postgraduate School who were familiar with the importance of network 
vulnerabilities. An experiment record sheet was also used to record the number of 
unexpected user errors during each task and how satisfied they were with the design. 
1. High Level Task List 
A task analysis provides an in-depth understanding of the importance, frequency, 
and sequence of actions that a user must execute to complete certain critical tasks within 
CARTT. The list provided below identifies only the top-level tasks, not how they are 
accomplished. These key tasks focus on the operator because most of the operation and the 
objectives in CARTT are designed around the operator.  
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Seven high level key tasks were selected as an experimental test and goals. 
Key tasks: 
o Create an account 
o Configure and conduct a scan 
o Check status of a previous scan 
o Start a previously configured scan 
o Import a completed scan 
o Begin exploit process 
o View/Send messages 
2. User Scenarios  
The user scenarios were tightly centered on the three types of CARTT users 
(operator, administrator, and commander). The scenarios were designed to visualized and 
apply possible solutions captured during the experience as they proceed toward the 
completion of each task during the experiment. 
 
Scenario 1: As an operator (Tier 2), perform the following task: 
 
• Task 1: Create an account (2 min) 
• Task 2: View/Send Messages (2 min) 
• Task 3: Based on the message you received from the commander, check the 
network vulnerabilities within the assigned network and send a message to the 
commander with your findings. (5 min) 
• Task 4: Configuration and Conduct a Scan (2 min) 
• Task 5: Check status of a previous scan (2 min) 
• Task 6 Start a previously configured scan (2 min) 
• Task 7: Import a Completed Scan (2 min) 
• Task 8: Begin Exploit Process (3 min) 




Scenario 2: Log in as the administrator with the provided credential, perform the 
following task (1 min) 
 
• Task 1: Unlock an account (1 min) 
• Task 2: Approve an account (1 min) 
• Task 3: Delete an account (1 min) 
Scenario 3: Log in as the commander with the provided credential, perform the following 
task (1 min) 
 
• Task 1: send an email to the Tier 2 with the instruction to conduct a scan with the 
Scan Name: provided. (2 min) 
C. USABILITY SPECIFICATION 
The usability scale specification for the operator is shown in Table 1; it is a 
comparison between the tasks that the operator performed in the original CARTT design 
and the target level achieved by the test operator using the expanded graphical UI. This 
process was used to aim for a target level of efficiency by removing redundant clicks.  
Table 1. Operator Usability Scale 
Task Usability Attribute Value to be Measured Previous Level* Current 
Average 
Level† 
Create an Account Initial impression Interview question N/A 1 
Configured Scan Initial impression Interview question 4 1 
Conduct a Scan Initial performance Clicks/taps 3 3 
Conduct a Scan Number of errors Any suboptimal click/
tap resulting in 
backtracking 
2 1 
Conduct a Scan Efficiency Clicks/taps (assuming 
you must edit 
everything) 
3 1 
Check status of a 
previous scan 
Initial impression Interview question 3 1 
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Task Usability Attribute Value to be Measured Previous Level* Current 
Average 
Level† 
Check status of a 
previous scan 
Initial performance Clicks/taps 2 1 
Check status of a 
previous scan 
Number of errors Any suboptimal click/
tap resulting in 
backtracking 
2 0 
Check status of a 
previous scan 
Efficiency Clicks/taps (assuming 
you must edit 
everything) 
3 1 
Start a previously 
configured scan 
Initial impression Interview question 4 1 
Start a previously 
configured scan 
Initial performance Clicks/taps 3 1 
Start a previously 
configured scan 
Number of errors Any suboptimal click/
tap resulting in 
backtracking 
2 0 
Start a previously 
configured scan 
Efficiency Clicks/taps (assuming 
you must edit 
everything) 
3 1 
Import a completed 
scan 
Initial impression Interview question 4 
 
Import a completed 
scan 
Initial performance Clicks/taps 3 1 
Import a completed 
scan 
Number of errors Any suboptimal click/
tap resulting in 
backtracking 
2 0 
Import a completed 
scan 
Efficiency Clicks/taps (assuming 




*For the “Previous Level,” after testing against the previous design and procuring user feedback, 
we used the associated values from the usability attributes as a benchmark to ensure we made 
positive progression with the new design.  
†For the interview/survey questions, we assumed a 5-point Likert scale.  
 
For each participant in the usability study, the following steps were taken: 
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(1) Participant was briefed as to the purpose of the study and their role, and then 
given brief instructions as per the user scenario. 
(2) Participant executed each task in the sequence, and during task execution their 
performance was recorded, and data was collected as outlined in the usability specification 
(see Table 2 below). 
(3) Lastly, the data were analyzed to determine if usability specifications have been 
met with the new UI. 
1. Data Collection 
For the data collection, I presented the subjects using the 5-point Likert as an 
evaluation scale. On the five-point difficulty/success scale, each rating represented the 
following:  
• 1 = least difficult (task completed successfully with no error) 
• 2 = minor difficulties (task completed after short, unsuccessful clicks/short 
detour) 
• 3 = moderate difficulties (task completed by self and after multiple 
unsuccessful clicks/long detour) 
• 4 = major difficulties (task completed with the assistance and after 
numerous unsuccessful clicks/long detour) 
• 5 = most difficult task or give up 
Each user was interviewed immediately following each task. At the end of each 
scenario, the subjects were asked how satisfied they felt and what changes they would 
suggest to improve the GUI.  
D. RESULTS 
After getting users’ responses on usability testing for the operator about the current 
CARTT user interface, it was essential to know about their overall satisfaction on each task 
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performed during the experiment. Table 2 shows  the results from the five student subjects 
on how satisfied they were completion of each task and common trends. Table 3 shows the 
results of the administrators’ tasks, and Table 4 shows the results of the commanders’ tasks. 
Table 2. Operator Tasks 
Task 1.1 Create an Account  
Average 
Satisfaction 




The account type selection should not be set to administrator as 
the first option for the user. The user should be forced to select 
from the current dropdown menu. 
 
Task 2.1 Configuration and Conduct a Scan 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Entering the data requested was made easy but it took too long 
to display, and the user was not sure if the task requested was 
submitted. 
 
Task 2.2. Enter an IP address and Subnet for the Target network as well as a unique name 
for the scan. 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Entering the data requested was made easy but it took too long 




Task 2.3. Enter the name of a scan to check its progress 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Entering the data requested was made easy but it took too long to 




  Task 2.4. Please select the IP address of the target host. 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Entering the data requested was made easy but it took too long 
to display, and the user was not sure if the task requested was 
submitted. 
A selection of the host for further analysis and display of the 
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vulnerability vs. manually entering or copy and paste may not 
be the best option because of the increase of errors.  
Task 3.1. Check status of a previous scan 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting visual feedback in the “Scan Status” page, e.g.: 
green check marks for successfully completed scan, red “X” for 
failed scan, or yellow for pending/in progress. 
Task 4.1. Start a previously configured scan 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Entering the data requested was made easy but it took too long 
to display, and the user was not sure if the task requested was 
submitted. 
Task 5.1. Import a Completed Scan 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Entering the data requested was made easy but it took too long 
to display, and the user was not sure if the task requested was 
submitted. 
 Task 5.2 Please enter the CVE of a Vulnerability 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting to be able to preselect the CVE displayed for the 
configuration process for exploitation. 
Task 5.3 Copy and paste a module into the text field to construct an exploit. 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting to be able to preselect the CVE displayed for the 
configuration process for exploitation. 
Task 6.1. Begin Exploit Process 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting to be able to preselect the module displayed for 
exploitation attempt and validation vs. copy and paste in order 
to minimize errors. 
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Task 7.1. View/Send Messages 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting to view only email assigned to the organization so 
that they can focus only on their organization tasks. 
Table 3. Administrator Tasks 
Task 1 Unlock Account 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting that the user get a notification message that the 
account has been unlock. 
Task 2 Approve Account 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting that the user get a notification message that the 
account has been approved. 
Task 3 Delete Account 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting a second warning page or popup before the delete is 
final. This is a critical task therefore 2 warnings should be 
appropriate. Requesting that the user get a notification message 
that the account has been deleted. 
Task 4 Add Organization 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting a drop-down menu instead of user entering the five 
digits. The current design increases the number of potential 
error entry. 
Task 5 Delete Organization 
Average 
Satisfaction 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1 with an average of ≈ 1 




account has been deleted. 
 
Table 4. Commander Tasks 
Task 1 Access Account  
Average 
Satisfaction 




Change the UIC to command name. 
 
Task 2 Send Message 
Average 
Satisfaction 




Requesting that the user get a notification message that the 
account has been send and that the user received the message, 
and the tasking is in work in progress. 
 
 
From the collected data, the completion of each task was analyzed. The tasks were 
divided by success level criteria, as shown in Tables 5 and 6, using the 5-point Likert scale 
scoring method.  




1 Task completed successfully with no error 
2 Task completed after short unsuccessful clicks/short detour 
3 Task completed without assistance and after multiple unsuccessful 
clicks/long detour 
4 Task completed with assistance after multiple unsuccessful clicks/
long detour 
5 Task incomplete 
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Table 6. High-Level Task Success Results 
Task Task 1.1 Task 2.1 Task 3.1 Task 4.1 Task 5.1 Task 6.1 Task 7.1 
Success 
Rate 
1, 1, 1, 2, 
1 with an 
average 
of ≈ 1 
1, 2, 1, 2, 
1 with an 
average 
of ≈ 1 
1, 1, 1, 1, 
1 with an 
average 
of ≈ 1 
1, 2, 1, 1, 
1 with an 
average 
of ≈ 1 
1, 2, 1, 1, 
1 with an 
average 
of ≈ 2 
1, 2, 2, 2, 
1 with an 
average 
of ≈ 2 
1, 1, 1, 1, 
1 with an 
average 
of ≈ 1 
In Table 6, the number of failed tasks was not used in this analysis because 
completion of tasks was the focus of this analysis. Thus, failed tasks did not have any 
significance during the test and evaluation. 
We determined that calculating the average completion time of each task was not a 
valid way to measure effectiveness or user satisfaction for this study since some scenarios 
took very long to complete after the user had completed all tasks. For instance, the 
processes to “Conduct a Scan” can take several hours to complete when the operator must 
scan for vulnerabilities on a large operational network, and the time completion cannot be 
used as a measure of user ability or satisfaction.  
1. Result Analysis and Discussion
Based on the requirement set for the usability testing of CARTT, the success rate 
measurement was evaluated and analyzed. All the tasks were accomplished, and the type 
and the number of errors were primarily related to the virtual environment and not the UI 
design. In general comments, the subjects were not very satisfied with the network latency 
during the testing. The users got impatient waiting for a network response, which led to 
them clicking multiple times on an execution button.  
The success rate was associated with the simplicity of the page and that most of the 
data were started locally with the help of PostgreSQL. Another factor contributing to the 
success rate is the familiarity with the user input requested and the page’s layout. Users 
noticed the usefulness of the left-side vertical navigation bar that provided quick access to 
the critical tasks and showed the actual content and effectiveness of the site readily 
available.  
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2. Conclusions and Recommendations 
We leveraged the diagnostic evaluation criteria above, necessitated the use of five 
test subjects to find and fix problems associated with the application. The corrective actions 
required to address the deficiencies identified in and during the usability analysis were 
implemented during the design phases. The test and evaluation were conducted to assess 
the quantitative (task accomplished in a scenario and errors) and qualitative (user 
satisfaction)   CARTT’s expanded graphical user interface and user experience. The user 
satisfaction was likely due to very slow performance due to the use of the virtual machine 
to do the CARTT test and evaluation. We could leverage jQuery or similar technologies to 
provide visual indications and feedback, but we cannot change the server response speed. 
Popular frameworks are PHPUnit and CodeCeption and the use of bare-metal server may 
help to isolate this issue.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on testing and evaluating CARTT functionality with the new 
UI and user satisfaction while interacting with the GUI. During the experiment, the five 
subjects felt that CARTT had overall performance issues due to back-end bugs. The ten 
usability heuristics used to design the UI should continue to be used for the UI, emphasizing 
error prevention and recognition. CARTT implementation and testing design difficulties 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. SUMMARY
The primary goal of this thesis was to extend CARTT development by integrating
a GUI for accessing open-source penetration testing software tools and techniques to 
uncover network vulnerabilities and launch exploits against those vulnerabilities. The main 
objective was to improve the aesthetics of CARTT and improve responsiveness and 
efficiency for improving usability and the user experience.   
This research has proven that we can fully automate the specific process to scan 
devices and detect vulnerabilities on a targeted network without the extensive training 
required to perform DOD red teaming. The work continues to demonstrate that we can 
fully automate open-source network scanning and vulnerability assessment tools to address 
the number of DOD red teams available and the ill-proportioned cybersecurity team to 
support the ever-growing DOD digital footprint. A usability testing was performed to 
assess the GUI performance using some of Nielsen’s ten usability heuristics as a parameter. 
Some modifications were recommended by the test subjects’ feedback to improve the 
usability of CARTT.  
B. CONCLUSION
The CARTT GUI was designed for non-expert users with little to no experience
and knowledge of using tools such as OpenVAS and MSF. The expanded GUI for web-
based CARTT provides its users with the essentials tools necessary to conduct vulnerability 
scans by automating tasks that require knowledge and experience in red teaming, in 
particular to scan the vulnerabilities on an organization’s targeted IT infrastructure. The 
user interface plays a fundamental role in software use and utility. The user experience is 
based on the exact amount of information required by the user. The design of the user 
interface can have a significant positive or negative impact on the user experience. 
Nielsen’s ten usability heuristics can be used as a strategy to successfully design user 
interfaces. We address the specific research questions for this thesis in the following 
sections. 
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1. Primary Research Question 
How can a web-based graphical user interface be developed for CARTT to allow 
non-expert users to build, integrate, and launch exploits using Cyber Red Team tools and 
techniques? 
We successfully developed the web-based graphical user interface for CARTT, and 
tested the web-based GUI to evaluate the site’s functionality, effectiveness, and efficiency. 
We also focused on learnability, memorability, minimizing errors, and improving user 
satisfaction based on the new interface.  
2. Second Research Question 
How can CARTT safely integrate automation into a client/server architecture 
without causing system issues during automated vulnerability scan? 
To make sure CARTT is fully functional, we used subjects to test its end-to-end 
functionality. CARTT users, operators, administrators, and commanders could log in 
securely, configure scan on a remote target host, conduct a vulnerability scan, check the 
status of the previous scans, import the last scan, and send messages between users. 
CARTT users must know essential network information related to the target host, such as 
IP address, subnet mask, and see the name of previous scans. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis focused on improving the user experience by expanding the graphical 
user interface, making the layout consistent, and remove reddendum functions on the web 
browser. CARTT’s capabilities and user experience should continue to expand because of 
growing cybercriminals looking to penetrate systems, networks, services, and facilities.  
The following are some recommendations for future work to improve CARTT 
further. 
1. Improve the Backend of the User Interface 
There are many possible ways to improve the compliance of UI design and 
improve the software quality. The code may require some refactoring around the 
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Model View Controller or similar architecture. This will help separate the user 
interface from the business logic and perform unit testing on the business logic. Due 
to the constant involvement of UI design, a system could be developed to review, 
check for any errors, and check for any design features that are too odd for CARTT 
(i.e., colors, notation consistency, shapes, etc.).   
2. CARTT User Expansion  
The login could include an additional user as “standard.” The user could 
automatically scan their own device to assess any vulnerabilities that could allow 
unauthorized users to access their computer. The standard user should have the 
capability to raise an alert to their network administrator to patch these 
vulnerabilities in order to increase cybersecurity.  
3. Improve the Scan Result 
CARTT could provide the high-risk level classification of the network 
vulnerabilities discovered. The display of the level of severity and how a problem could be 
fixed would be helpful information for the operator as for the commander. The 
classification of the severity, number, and types of vulnerabilities could also be displayed 
in a comprehensive and graphical report. This display can become very useful when the 
users are scanning an extensive network and could help provide an overview of the 
network’s health.  
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